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The Persian Gulf War Cease-Fire
Agreement Compared with the Japanese
Peace Treaty in Terms of Reparations
and Reconstruction'
I. Introduction
On September 3, 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt in his
Neutrality Address said, "The influence of America should be con-
sistent in seeking for humanity a final peace which will eliminate, as
far as it is possible to do so, the continued use of force between na-
tions."2 Roosevelt's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, also em-
phasized the importance of "creating a stable and enduring order
under law."' At the conclusion of World War II, Japan was com-
pletely defeated by the Allied Powers and was forced to surrender
unconditionally.4 The hope for lasting peace was incarnated in the
Japanese Peace Treaty (Treaty). This document provided minor rep-
arations for the victor' while rebuilding the vanquished.6
Approximately fifty years after the observations of President
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull, President Bush, at the com-
mencement of the Persian Gulf War, made the following statement:
We have in this past year made great progress in ending
the long era of conflict and Cold War. We have before us the
opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a
new world order . . . an order in which a credible United Na-
tions can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise envi-
sioned of the U.N.'s founders.7
At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Iraq agreed to
the terms for peace provided by the United Nations (UN) under the
1. The author thanks Professor Joseph Kelly and Carl Schultz, J.D. Candidate 1993,
both of the Dickinson School of Law, for their help in directing the research and organizing
the structure of this Comment.
2. F. S. DUNN, PEACE-MAKING AND THE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN 3 (1963).
3. Id.
4. Id. at ix.
5. See id. at 152-153.
6. Id. at 144.
7. Grammas, Multilateral Responses To The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Economic
Sanctions and Emerging Proliferation Controls, 15 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1991) (quot-
ing Address of President Bush to the Nation on Persian Gulf War, Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1991,
at A29)).
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Cease-Fire Agreement (Agreement)." The hope for a lasting peace
was then placed into. a document that made restoration of the de-
feated party contingent upon that party's capitulation to the victors'
demands for substantial reparations.
This Comment analyzes the Japanese Peace Treaty and the
Persian Gulf War Cease-Fire Agreement as to reparations to the
victors and restoration to the defeated. Section II provides a brief
background of the conflict between the Allied Powers and Japan
during World War II, as well as a more lengthy recounting of the
history of the Persian Gulf War. Section III discusses reparations
provided by the Treaty and the Agreement by examining land and
economic power, occupation, military power, and cash and non-cash
repayments. Section IV compares restoration of the losing party
under the Treaty with that of the Agreement by considering con-
cerns for national sovereignty and reparations. Section V concludes
that the Cease-Fire Agreement may be more desirable than the Jap-
anese Peace Treaty for the victors; whereas the success of restora-
tions under the Treaty had to precede reparations, under the Agree-
ment reparations have to precede restoration.
II. Background
A. The Japanese Peace Treaty
Imperial Japan was an aggressive and formidible military
power. In 1931 Imperial Japan seized Manchuria. During World
War II, the Tokyo-Berlin Axis allied Nazi Germany with Imperial
Japan. Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941, bringing the United
States into the war in the Pacific. Japan also seized many European
colonies in Southeast Asia. Despite these gradual achievements for
Japan, Allied troops were able to recover all these colonies; in 1945
the United States dropped atomic bombs which destroyed two Japa-
nese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Subsequently, Japan was
forced to surrender unconditionally to the Allied Powers.
The United States occupied Japan after World War II until
1952. During that time, the United States wrote a new democratic
Constitution for Japan in 1947. In addition, the Japanese Peace
Treaty was signed by forty-eight nations and Japan in 1951.' This
Treaty's execution occurred six years after the Japanese surrender.
The delay resulted from disagreements among the Allied Powers
concerning the appropriate amount of reparations that Japan should
8. Starke, Distinction between a Suspension of Hostilities and a Cease-Fire, 65 Aus-
TRALIAN L.J. 293 (1991).
9. F.S. DUNN, supra note 1, at ix.
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remit10 and objections by Communist nations to attempts by the
United States to establish a close alliance with Japan against
Communism."
B. The Persian Gulf War Cease-Fire Agreement
Iraq first claimed that Kuwait was a part of Iraq in 1961.12 The
claim was made immediately after Kuwait had declared herself to be
independent dnd no longer a British protectorate.13 Kuwait appealed
to the United Nations, and received protection against Iraq from
both Britain and Saudi Arabia."' The imminent Iraqi invasion thus
was prevented.
The Iran-Iraq War lasted from 1980 to 1988. Kuwait aided
Iraq during the conflict by giving oil and generous credit to Iraq.,5
Iraq emerged from the eight year war with a debt of $100 billion. 6
After the war, Iraq's President Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of
aggravating Iraq's financial liabilities.17 First, he reasoned that Ku-
wait should cancel Iraq's $10 billion debt18 because Iraq fought on
behalf of the Islamic world during the Iran-Iraq War.1" Second,
President Hussein said that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) had exceeded oil production limits provided by the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 0 President Hussein
said that the OPEC violation increased the market supply of oil and
lowered the value of oil at a loss to Iraq of $14 billion in profits. 21
Third, President Hussein accused Kuwait of robbing Iraq of $2.4
billion worth of oil by extracting oil from lands over which both Iraq
and Kuwait claimed dominion. 22 Subsequently, both Iraq and Ku-
wait militarily fortified their adjacent borders.23
Efforts were instituted to resolve the brewing conflict. Kuwait
notified the United Nations Secretary General of the problem on
July 19, 1990. This action was criticized by Iraq as part of a West-
ern 'imperialist' scheme. 24 That same day, Kuwait advised the Arab
10. See e.g. id. at 146.
11. See id. at 172-173.
12. Green, Iraq, The U.N. and The Law, 29 ALBERTA L.R. 560, 563 (1991).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. id.
16. Askari, The Next Persian Gulf Explosion, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1991, § 3, at 15,
col. 2.
17. Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: The U.N. Response, 15 So. ILL. UNIV. L. J.
431, 432 (1991).
18. Grammas, supra note 7, at 5.
19. Green, supra note 12, at 564.
20. Nanda, supra note 17, at 432.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Grammas, supra note 7, at 4.
24. id.
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League that Iraq had repeatedly failed to respond to Kuwait's over-
tures to settle the dispute.2 5 On July 25, 1990, OPEC ordered Ku-
wait and the UAE to decrease their oil production by one quarter.2
OPEC also increased the price per barrel of oil from approximately
$15 to $20, but rejected Iraq's request to raise the price to $25.27 On
July 31, 1990, Saudi Arabia began mediating negotiations concern-
ing boundary disputes between Iraq and Kuwait.2 8 Although the
meetings ended after two days without an agreement, the prospect of
future mediation was discussed.29However, on August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and occupied
her within six hours.30 At that time, Iraq announced that she had
annexed Kuwait."1 Iraq explained that the annexation was part of a
process of reunifying the single Arab World that had been split into
twenty-two Arab nations by European colonialism.3"
This Iraqi action caused sanctions of condemnation to be levied
from around the world against Iraq. The United States, Japan,
France, and many European nations promptly froze Iraqi and
Kuwaiti assets and placed economic sanctions on Iraq.33 In addition,
Iraq's use of force was condemned by the former Soviet Union,
Israel, Japan, Iran, Western Europe, and several nations in Latin
America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.3 The UN Security Council
Resolution No. 660 ordered broad economic sanctions against Iraq
and her unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.3"
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was used as an assembly base for the
twenty-six nation, anti-Iraq coalition [Coalition].31 Pursuant to Res-
olution 678,; on November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council au-
thorized the use of "all necessary means", to evict Iraq from Kuwait
if Iraq did not leave prior to January 15, 1991.11
The Kuwaiti Invasion saw President Hussein's strategy to ap-
peal to Arab unity and to xenophobia 38, while promoting the success
of the Kuwait invasion. President Hussein called for a jihad, a holy
war, against the UN forces.39 This invasion was denounced by some
25. Id.
26. Nanda, supra note 17, at 432.
27. Grammas, supra note 7, at 4.
28. Id. at 4-5.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id.
31. Nanda, supra note 17, at 433.
32. Id. at 433, n.19.
33. Id.
34. Grammas, supra note 7, at 5.
35. Nanda, supra note 17, at 415, n.17 (citing 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990)).
36. Nelan, Call to Arms, TIME, Sept. 24, 1990, at 32.
37. Starke, supra note 8, at 293.
38. Hatred or fear of foreigners. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1644 (2nd ed.
1984).
39. Nanda, supra note 17, at 35.
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Arab nations, the majority of which shifted their focus to decrying
the intrusion by the United States military into the conflict.4 0 Presi-
dent Hussein indicated that he would consider the withdrawal from
Kuwait only if Israel withdrew from lands claimed by Arabs.4 1
Drawing Israel into the Kuwait invasion controversy was a rallying
cry for Arabs to join together because Israel represents a foreign
presence designed to weaken the Arabs.4 2
In the following conflict with UN forces, President Hussein also
tried to draw Israel into the conflict again by bombing Israeli cit-
ies.4 3 If Israel and the United States teamed against Iraq, other
Arab nations would be obliged by their consciences to defend their
fellow Arab nation against foreign attack. President Hussein also
hoped to sustain the presence of the UN coalition in Arab terri-
tory. 5 A prolonged stay by UN forces might decrease their commit-
ment to go to war with Iraq, while increasing Arab fears and antag-
onism against the armed foreigners.'
On January 9, 1991, the United States met with Iraq at a Ge-
neva conference and gave Iraq an ultimatum: leave Kuwait by Janu-
ary 15, 1991, or else the twenty-eight nation military coalition would
begin a war to liberate Kuwait. 7 When Iraq remained in Kuwait
after the deadline, Operation Dessert Storm began with. an air-strike
on Baghdad on January 16,1991.48 On February 24, 1991, the Coa-
lition ground armies entered the war." The Iraqi army fled Kuwait
City on February 26, 1991.0 On February 27, 1991, when the Coa-
lition army entered Kuwait City, civilian crowds rejoiced by chant-
ing "U.S.A."'" The Coalition forces had destroyed Iraqi defenses to
the extent that allied infantry could have, easily entered Baghdad
uncontested.52
Then, on February 27, 1991, President Bush announced that the
coalition forces would suspend combat, but that the permanancy of
the suspension was contingent upon Iraq's compliance with the rele-
40. Talhami, The Ideology of Arab Nationalism and the Persian Gulf Crisis, 15 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 511 (1991).
41. Nanda, supra note 17, at 433.
42. Weinbaum, Arab Opinion, U.S. Foreign Policy, And The Persian Gulf, 15 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 501, 502 (1991).
43. Lacayo, Five Decisive Moments, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 33.
44. Weinbaum, supra note 42, at 508.
45. Id. at 507.
46. Id.
47. Lacayo, supra note 43, at 32.
48. Nelan, Could Saddam Have Done Better, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at .
49. Nelan, Free at Last! Free at Last!, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 38 [hereinafter Free at
Last].
50. Id. at 40.
51. Id.
52. Lacayo, supra note 43, at 33.
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vant UN resolutions.5" President Bush indicated that the relevant
resolutions included relinquishing Kuwait and paying reparations for
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. 54 Subsequently, the Iraqi foreign minis-
ter delivered the following message: "I would like to inform you that
the Iraqi Government agrees to adhere to Resolutions 662 and 674 if
the Security Council orders an immediate cease-fire and an end to
all land, sea and air military operations. ' 55 Finally, on April 3, 1991,
the terms of the Persian Gulf War Cease-Fire Agreement were set
forth by the UN Security Council in Resolution 687.56
III. Reparations
A. Introduction
Both the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Persian Gulf Cease-
Fire Agreement attempted to provide feasible means for the losing
party in each underlying conflict to make amends for war damages.
For example, both the Treaty and the Agreement forced the losing
parties to do the following: 1) relinquish territory and economic
power; 2) be subjected to occupation at the expense of the victorious
party; and 3) limit their military power.
However, the Treaty and the Agreement differed in cash and
non-cash reparations. The Treaty tried to achieve its goals by en-
couraging Japanese growth and fostering good relations with the
parties in order to facilitate the reparation process.57 In contrast, the
Agreement fails to foster amicable relations between the parties. The
Agreement maintains an effective embargo until, and as long as, the
reparations are made.58
The Treaty recognized that Japan could not make complete war
reparations and "maintain a viable economy." 9 Consequently, cash
reparations were limited. In contrast with the Treaty, the Agreement
seeks to retrieve substantial cash reparations from Iraq's existing re-
sources.60 The Treaty also sought non-cash reparations, including the
following: services,"' products, 2 political alliance, 3 favored trade
53. See Gerstenzang & Williams, Bush Halts Combat, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 1991, at
Al, col. 5.
54. Id.
55. Starke, supra note 8, at 293.
56. U.N. Sec. Council Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/Res/687 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M.
846 (1991) [hereinafter Resolution 687].
57. F.S. DUNN, supra note 2, at 144 passim.
58. E.g., see Tyler, Iraq Is Blocking Aid Distribution, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1991, §1, at
4, col. I [hereinafter Blocking Aid].
59. Japanese Peace Treaty, Sept. 8, 1951, art. 14, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3180, T.I.A.S. No.
2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, 60-62 [hereinafter Japanese Peace Treaty].
60. See infra text accompanying notes 109-117.
61. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 14(a)(l).
62. See id.
63. F.S DUNN, supra note 2, at 144.
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status,"" and trial for war crimes.65 Meanwhile, the Agreement seeks
non-cash reparations such as oil,66 strategic information,67 and the
establishment of the United Nations as a police power to enforce a
new world order.6 8
B. Relinquishing Territory and Economic Power
Both the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Persian Gulf War
Cease-Fire Agreement attempted to have the losing parties in the
underlying conflicts relinquish certain territorial claims. The Treaty
provided that Japan would renounce claims to the following lands:
Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, a portion of Sa-
khalin and adjacent islands, the Antarctic area, the Spratly Islands,
and the Paracel Islands.69 These territories were important to Ja-
pan's colonial economy.7"
Similarly under the Agreement, Iraq was to renounce her
claims to Kuwait. The Agreement required Iraq to recognize the
boundaries between Kuwait and Iraq as set out in a treaty between
them in 1964.71 Iraq would have produced 20% of the world's oil
had she been able to retain Kuwait. 72 Prior to the Kuwait invasion,
Iraq already controlled half of the Gulf's oil-exporting nations
though her intimidation techniques.73 Thus, the victorious parties
under both the Agreement and the Japanese Peace Treaty accom-
plished the important goals of thwarting the expansion of the losing
parties.
C. Costly Occupation by Victors
The conclusion of both wars terminated with the expensive
maintenance of the victors' military presence in the regions. The
purposes of both occupations were ostensibly to maintain the peace
that the victors had achieved.
Peace keeping methods are expensive. For example, during her
six-year occupation of Japan, the United States spent $2 billion.74
Similar to the United States occupation of Japan, the UN will ac-
crue significant costs in maintaining order at the conclusion of the
Persian Gulf War.
64. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 12-13.
65. Id., art. 11.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 149-170.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 171-173.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 174-80.
69. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 2.
70. F.S DUNN, supra note 2, at 171.
71. Resolution 687, supra note 56, 2.
72. Weinbaum, supra note 44, at 505.
73. Id. at 505.
74. F.S DUNN, supra note 2, at 148.
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An example of the cost of maintaining order is the UN observer
unit's overseeing of a demilitarized zone extending ten miles into
Iraq and five miles into Kuwait, in an effort to prevent boundary
aggressions.75 The UN has already appropriated $60,977,000 for this
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission.76 Thus, the Coalition is at
risk of investing substantial amounts of money to keep the peace
through occupation, like the United States was forced to do in Japan
at the conclusion of World War II.
D. Limiting Military Power
Both the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Persian Gulf War
Cease-Fire Agreement placed substantial limits on the military pow-
ers of losing parties to limit their ability to initiate a future conflict.
The need for the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 to place limits on
Japan's arms was obviated by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution
of 1947, in which Japan had already renounced war.77 General Mac-
Arthur believed, moreover, that the renunciation of the war clause
reflected the sentiment of the Japanese, who had lost two cities as
the result of the atomic bomb.78 Yet the treaty also recognized that
Japan had "the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense" pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 9
The United States armed forces, furthermore, would retain Japanese
bases at a great expense to limit future aggression by either Japan or
the Soviet Union. 80
Similarly, the Agreement also tries to limit the threat of future
Iraqi aggression. The Agreement provides that Iraq shall uncondi-
tionally accept the destruction of the following: all chemical and bio-
logical weapons, as well as all research, development, support, and
manufacturing facilities;81 "all ballistic missiles with a range greater
than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and produc-
tion facilities; ' ' 82 and all "nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usa-
ble material or any subsystems or components or any research, de-
velopment, support or manufacturing facilities related to the
above." a8 3 In addition, Iraq was to submit the location of these chem-
ical, biological, and ballistic weapons to the UN within fifteen days
75. Resolution 687, supra note 56, T5.
76. G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/260 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 843
(1991).
77. See F.S DUNN, supra note 2, at 54.
78. See id.
79. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 5.
80. F.S DUNN, supra note 2, at 191.
81. Resolution 687, supra note 56, 8.
82. Id.
83. Id., 12.
[Vol. 10:3
AGREEMENT VS. TREATY
of the adoption of the resolution.84
The Agreement provides that the UN will monitor Iraq's future
compliance with the resolution pursuant to a plan developed by the
UN within 120 days of the passage of the resolution.8 5 The Agree-
ment also provides that the Director-General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency and a UN Special Commission will carry
out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based
on designations of the commission and on Iraq's own declarations.86
Pursuant to the agreement and within fifteen days of its passage,
Iraq was to give the location, quantity, and description of nuclear
materials to the UN Secretary General.817 In addition, Iraq shall not
develop or acquire nuclear weapons or materials in the future.88
Compliance of these items will be monitored and verified by the UN
Special Commission.89
The Agreement utilizes, moreover, positive reinforcement to en-
courage Iraq to comply with the military restrictions. Specifically,
the Agreement provides that the UN may lift the prohibition against
"import of products and commodities originating in Iraq" and re-
lated financial transactions,9" if Iraq complies with the relevant por-
tion of the Agreement 9 relating to the destruction of prohibited
chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.92 The UN will
review prohibitions on Iraqi commodities 120 days following the res-
olution's passage and on a regular basis.9 3 Also, the UN will consider
arms control in the region, as well as Iraq's compliance with the
resolution.94
For several reasons, reparations in the form of limiting Iraqi
arms is particularly valuable to the Coalition in the Persian Gulf
War. First, the UN appears, under the Cease-Fire Agreement, to be
neutralizing the dangerous nuclear capabilities of Iraq. For example,
blue prints of an atomic bomb that Iraq planned to build were dis-
covered by the UN.95 These points indicated that Iraq could have
produced an atomic bomb capable of being carried by a missile
within a year. 96 Iraq only needed greater supplies of fissionable ura-
84. Id., 19.
85. Id., I 10.
86. Id., 13.
87. Id., 12.
88. Id.
89. Id., 13.
90. U.N. Sec. Council Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/Res/661 (1990).
91. Id., $ 8-13, 19
92. Id., 22.
93. Id.
94. Id., 22.
95. UN Team Finds Iraq Atom Bomb Plans, Chic. Trib., Oct. 26, 1991, at 3, col. C.
[hereinafter U.S. Team].
96. Id.
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nium and plutonium to complete construction of her atom bomb.97
In addition, Iraq was wo'rking towards building a bomb of even
greater destructive power than the atomic bomb, namely the Hydro-
gen bomb.98 Interestingly, the nerve-center of Iraq's nuclear program
was not destroyed by the thorough allied bombings in 1991. 1 Argua-
bly, Iraq would have been able to construct the bomb after the Per-
sian Gulf War if the Agreement had failed to create United Nations
inspection teams to extinguish the Iraqi nuclear program.
Second, the Allied Nations uncovered an enormous Iraqi arse-
nal of chemical weapons to destroy. The UN will need to work until
at least 1993 to completely eliminate Iraq's large quantity of chemi-
cal weapons. 100 Third, the UN has been successful in destroying cer-
tain important Iraqi weapons. For instance, UN weapon inspectors
have searched by helicopter for Iraqi missiles and launchers to de-
stroy.101 The weapon inspectors also have destroyed substantial num-
bers of Iraqi Scud launchers and Scud missiles." 2 Some UN Inspec-
tors must continue to search for more weapons because Iraq has
failed to identify the locations of approximately 300 Scud missiles.103
However, some UN Inspectors believe that the supposedly missing
missiles may actually have been destroyed during the Persian Gulf
War.
10 4
The Agreement of necessity also limits future Iraqi aggression
by maintaining an expensive UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mis-
sion.1°5 In contrast with Japan at the conclusion of World War 11,106
Iraq has not indicated in form or spirit a renunciation of war. 0 7 The
Agreement eliminated Iraq's most dangerous weapons, but allowed
her to keep sizeable armed forces.108 Thus, not unlike the United
States Armed Forces based in Japan, a coalition force is maintained
under the Agreement to deter future aggressions between Iraq and
Kuwait.
97. UN: Iraqi Bomb Tests, Newsday, Oct. 25, 1991, at 14.
98. Lewis, U.N. to Impose New Arms Curbs on Iraq, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1991, at A6,
col. 1.
99. Allies Failed To Destroy Iraq Nuclear 'Nerve Center,' UN says, N.Y. Times, Oct.
8, 1991, at 5.
100. U.S. Team, supra note 95, at 3.
101. See Rowe, U.N. to Urge Iraq to 'Come Clean" on Nuclear Plans, The Wash. Post,
Oct. 4, 1991, at A20 [hereinafter Come Clean on Nuclear Plans].
102. UN Copter Team Begins Iraq Search, Chic. Trib., Oct. 4, 1991, 1 News, at 5.
103. Meisler, 300 Iraq Scuds Missing, U.N. Team Reports, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1991,
at AI0, col. 1.
104. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
106. See supra text accompanying note 77.
107. See, e.g., Tyler, Baghdad Now Seen Exerting Economic Pressure on Kurds, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 6, 1991, at A16, col. 1. The Hussein Government is engaged in a bloody war with
Kurdish rebels, as of November 6, 1991. Id.
108. Hart, What's Left of Iraq's Army, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 36.
[Vol. 10:3
AGREEMENT VS. TREATY
E. Cash Payments
In contrast to the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Agreement will
attempt to recover large reparations from the defeated party. The
Allies did not receive substantial cash reparations under the Japa-
nese Peace Treaty.'0 9 In fact, the Allied Powers received their great-
est financial reparations from Japan from the Japanese assets seized
during the war."' However, the Treaty forced Japan, using assets
she had held in neutral countries, to compensate those Allied soldiers
who had suffered "undue hardships" when they were held as Japa-
nese prisoners of war."' The United States did not seek greater rep-
arations because she did not want to strip Japan of her resources.
The United States intended to create an ally out of Japan against
Communist nations. 12 The United States Foreign Minister Dulles,
who was assigned to handle the Treaty,' also reasoned that the
burden of bargaining for reparations outweighed the benefit of what
could be collected."" He based his opinion on the failure of the Al-
lies to collect reparations from Germany after World War I." 5
In contrast to the Treaty, the Persian Gulf War Cease-Fire
Agreement is designed to extract substantial funds from the defeated
party, oil-rich"' Iraq. Although Dulles was pessimistic about the
prospect of recovering significant war reparations, the Coalition did
not completely devastate Iraq during the brief Gulf War and now
seeks to cash in on the spared Iraqi assets. Article 16 of the Agree-
ment provides the following:
Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq
arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through
the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any
direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the
depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments,
nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful inva-
sion and occupation of Kuwait." 7
Article 16 of the Agreement may even enable mistreated prison-
ers of war"' to receive reparations. In addition, Iraq will pay its
109. See FS DUNN, supra note 2, at 152-153.
110. Id. at 153.
111. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 58, art. 16.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 136-140.
113. F.S DUNN, supra note 2, at 97.
114. Id. at 151-152.
115. Id.
116. Out of Joint; A New Arab Order, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1991, at 4. The sec-
ond largest number of oil reserves are in Iraq. Id.
117. Resolution 687, supra note 56, 16., '
118. See Meron, Prisoners of War, Civilians and Diplomats in The Gulf Crisis, 85 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 104 (1991). Iraq violated the rights under the fourth Geneva Convention of U.S.
citizens who were captured in Kuwait. Id. at 106.
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debts to a United Nations Commission, who will appropriately ad-
minister funds to the claimants. 119 Moreover, Iraq's contribution to
the fund will be "based on a percentage of the value of the exports of
petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure
to be suggested" by the UN, "taking into account the requirements
of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in con-
junction with the international financial institutions taking into con-
sideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi econ-
omy."1 2 The UN Security Council has placed a limit on annual
reparations by Iraq.' 2 ' The payments must never exceed her expend-
itures on arms before the Persian Gulf War.122 Before the war, Iraq
spent approximately $5 billion annually on arms.'
The UN will try to effectuate Iraqi repayments by positive-rein-
forcement methods built into the Agreement. For example, the UN'
may lift the prohibition on sale of foodstuffs that are essential to
civilian needs, 24 subject to review every sixty days "in light of the
policies and practices" of Iraq. 2 5 In addition, the UN can make ex-
ceptions to the prohibitions against the "import of products and com-
modities originating ,in Iraq" so that Iraq may have proper funds to
pay for foodstuffs essential to civilian needs. 26
Moreover, the UN will review prohibitions on Iraqi commodities
120 days following the resolution's passage and on a regular basis.127
Also, the UN will consider arms control in the region as well as
Iraq's compliance with the resolution. 28 Thus, the UN has at-
tempted to give the appearance through the Agreement that it is in
Iraq's best interest to make war monetary reparations. In contrast
with the Japanese Peace Treaty, Iraq's wealth and the UN embargo
enable the Agreement to be more optimistic in extracting cash repa-
rations from the losing party.
F. Non-Cash Payments
The Japanese Peace Treaty and the Persian Gulf War Cease-
Fire Agreement both try to procure non-cash reparations from the
losing party. The Japanese Peace Treaty attempted to maximize Ja-
pan's reparation contributions by having her repay in ways other
119. Resolution 687, supra at note 56, 18.
120. Id., 19.
121. Lewis, supra note 98, at A6.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 661 (1990).
125. Resolution 687, supra note 56, 20,21.
126. Id., 20, 23.
127. Id., 28.
128. Id.
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than cash, to avoid "any foreign exchange burden upon Japan."12 9
For example, Japan would make her people available to the Allied
Powers for repairing war damage, 130 including in the form of techni-
cal support.' Japan would also supply Allied Powers with manufac-
tured raw materials." 2 Allied Powers, moreover, could seize certain
non-exempted Japanese assets.33 For example, Allied Powers could
take advantage of new markets that would result as the consequence
of Japan being stripped of her colonial and quasi-colonial territo-
ries.13' Furthermore, Japanese assets located overseas could be
seized. 35
As a form of non-monetary payment, the Japanese Peace
Treaty also attempted to have Japan repay the victorious Allied
Powers by becoming a loyal and powerful ally against the former
Soviet Union.131 Secretary of State Dulles emphasized that Japan
should be treated as an equal and sovereign nation and allowed to
establish an upwardly mobile economy.137 The effect of this treat-
ment was designed to encourage Japan to chose Democracy over
Communism.' 38 Dulles feared that Japan's proximity to the Soviet
Union and China would lead Japan to rely economically on Commu-
nist nations, and thus, be sucked into the Communist world." 9 Con-
sequently, the United States sought and received assurances from
Japan that she would not establish relations with Communist China,
although the Japanese Peace Treaty itself had no provision to that
effect." o
Another non-monetary payment made by Japan pursuant to the
Japanese Peace Treaty was to allow Allied Nations to enjoy a fa-
vored status in Japan concerning commerce and law to the extent
that the Allied Nation afforded such a preference to Japan. Japan
accorded to each Allied Nation the status of most-favored nation
with respect to the taxation of internationally traded goods."' The
Allied Nations received national treatment in "shipping, navigation
and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical per-
sons and their interests" from Japan.4 2 However, Japan did not
129. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 14.
130. Id.
131. F.S. DUNN, supra note 2, at 171.
132. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 14.
133. Id.
134. See F.S. DUNN, supra note 2, at 171.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 144 passim.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 145.
140. Id.
141. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 12(b)(1)(i).
142. Id., art. 12(b)(1)(ii).
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have to provide such status to an Allied Nation in an area where the
Allied Nation did not provide similar status to Japan.4 s If an Allied
nation extended favored status to Japan, then she would reciprocate
with the same treatment. "
In the area of criminal prosecution, the Japanese Peace Treaty
brought war criminals to justice by trial. 1" This allowed reparations
in the form of retribution and deterrence. The Japanese Peace
Treaty provided that Japan would accept and enforce the sentences
of war criminals. 46 Japan could recommend clemency, (i.e. reduced
sentences or parole for certain prisoners,) which the governments im-
posing the sentences might accept.' 7 It is not clear whether trying
war criminals prevents future international atrocities.1' 8
In comparison, the Agreement has experienced mixed success in
achieving non-cash reparations for the Coalition. On one hand, the
major oil-importing members of the Coalition have missed an oppor-'
tunity to establish oil as a source for Iraqi reparation payments. The
UN Security Council allowed Iraq to sell $1.6 billion worth of crude
oil so that Iraq would have proper funds- to pay for foodstuffs and
medicine essential to civilian needs. 49 At this time, oil prices were at
a level higher than it had been in eight months, and the prices were
on a continual rise.'3 0 The time was right for the UN to consumate
the deal. The sale would increase the supply of oil on the market and
encourage a reduction in oil prices. In addition, the deal would si-
multaneously extract reparations from Iraq and help reconstruct the
Iraqi economy. However, Iraq's Oil Minister Osama A.R. al-Hiti re-
fused to approve such a bargain because he believed that such plan
was part of a UN political agenda to destroy President Saddam
Hussein's power by seizing economic control over Iraq's primary re-
source, oil.' 3 ' Iraq views the reparation process as a post-war assault
against President Hussein. The United States has said that she
wants all sanctions against Iraq maintained as long as President
Hussein stays in control of Iraq. 32 President Bush has antagonized
the Hussein administration by stating, among other things, "Let me
143. Id., art. 12(c).
144. Id., art. 13.
145. Id., art. 11.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Anderson, The Utility of the Proposed Trial and Punishment of Enemy Lead-
ers, 37 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1081 (1943).
149. Tyler, Iraq Oil Minister Rejects U.N. Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1991, at A9, col.
I [hereinafter Oil Minister].
150. Oil Prices Jump on Fears of Weak Supplies, Chic. Trib., Oct. 15, 1991, § Busi-
ness, at 6 [hereinafter Oil Prices Jump].
151. Oil Minister, supra note 149, at 6.
152. Kerr, Iraq Short of Key Commodities - Especially Money, The Reuters Lib rary
Report (May 10, 1991)(LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT file).
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reiterate, we want him (Hussein) out."" Thus, politics was a form
of reparations under the Japanese Peace Treaty,1 54 but politics
caused difficulty in collecting reparations under the Cease-Fire
Agreement.
Moreover, the Agreement's demands for Iraq to pay large repa-
rations may discourage Iraq from rebuilding her economy so that she
can make the reparations. Certainly, the UN has reason to believe
that Iraq has substantial currency assets because she has bought
food and medicine without selling oil. 15 5 However, trade analysts
have said that Iraq is deficient in cash assets.1 56 In addition, the size
of Iraq's debt is so immense that resumption of exporting oil to the
world may be necessary for Iraq to pay off her debts.
Furthermore, Iraq has incurred substantial liabilities during the
past war with Kuwait in 1991. Iraq caused at least $22 billion worth
of damage to Kuwait during Iraq's seven month occupation of Ku-
wait.1 57 Although the Agreement now provides that Iraq shall pay
reparations to Kuwait, Iraq has yet to consent. 58 The Persian Gulf
War, moreover, forced Turkey to shut down a pipeline running from
Iraq through Turkey and to the Mediterranean Sea, resulting in lost
proceeds of $380 million for Turkey.5  Iraq and Turkey are negoti-
ating as to whether Turkey's damages should be assessed- using full
capacity or actual oil flow as a basis for calculating the damages. 6 °
In additon, Iraq also had accumulated many liabilities prior to
invading Kuwait. For example, Iraq has a $100 billion debt from the
war with Iran that ended in 1988.61 Bulgaria is eager to collect the
$1.12 billion in oil owed to her by Iraq. 62 Iraq also owes $2 billion
in commercial loans guaranteed by the United States.'6"
Despite Iraq's large debt, she has not fully exploited her pri-
mary resource, oil, to help satisfy her obligations. Iraq has expressed
a reluctance to resume exporting oil to Europe because all proceeds
will be paid to the United Nations. Iraq's Oil Minister Hiti has re-.
153. World In Brief. Iraq; U.N. Official Seeks Better Cooperation, L.A Times, Oct. 6,
1991, at A14, col. 2 [hereinafter Better Cooperation].
154. See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
155. Rowe, U.N. Wonders How Iraq Imports Food, Keeps Oil; Conjecture Includes
Sale of Gold Reserves, The Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1991, at A17 (hereinafter UN Wonders].
156. Kerr, supra note 152.
157. Ibrahim, Most Oil Fires Are Out in Kuwait, But Its Environment is Devastated,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1991, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
158. Prokesch, Kuwait Seeks $5 Billion To Repair War Damage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1991, at 1, col. 4.
159. Turkey To Let Iraq Oil Flow Once Fees Resolved, The Reuters Library Report
(Sept. 21, 1991)(LEXIS, Nexis library, LBYRPT file).
160. Id.
161. Askari, supra note 16, at 15.
162. Bulgaria Still Hopes Iraq Will Repay Debts in Oil, The Reuters Library Report
(Apr. 25, 1991)(LEXIS, Nexis library, LBYRPT file).
163. Kerr, supra note 152.
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fused to export oil, by the pipeline through Turkey, to be shipped to
Europe.' 64 Mr. Hiti complained that the Agreement prevents Iraq
from selling to non-European nations.1 65 Iraq would be forced, more-
over, to lower the sale price to Asian consumers because of transport
differentials. 6 The Agreement, furthermore, stops Iraq from trans-
acting barter and pre-financing contracts, according to the Oil Min-
ister."'67 Mr. Hiti, consequently, has made no effort to open the pipe-
line because the UN reparation demands are "like a spider web.
Once you get into it, there is no end, and you will never be free."' 68
Iraq's refusal to sell oil for necessaries may indicate an Iraqi
political strategy and not an Iraqi surplusage of assets. 6 9 Thus,
while the Allied were able to receive reparations from Japan in the
1940s under Dulles' philosophy of allowing Japan's economy to de-
velop freely, 7 0 the chances of the UN now receiving reparations
from Iraq in the 1990s is threatened because the implementation of
the Persian Gulf Cease-Fire Agreement has heavily burdened Iraq's
economy.
On the other hand, the Agreement has acheived some non-mon-
etary reparations for the Coalition. First, the Coalition has gained
valuable access to information concerning which foreign countries
and organizations helped develop Iraq's nuclear capabilities. For ex-
ample, the UN discovered which companies gave aid to Iraq in de-
veloping a nuclear arsenal. 7 ' United States intelligence agencies
learned that China had, contrary to her promises, supplied informa-
tion to Iraq on how to construct nuclear weapons. 7 2 France supplied
Iraq with at least three tons of heavy water, a compound used for
running a nuclear reactor which can produce plutonium, a necessary
component for an atomic bomb.173 Thus, the victors in the Persian
Gulf War learned valuable information as a result of the agreement
about the trustworthiness of both certian corporations and other
nations.
The Agreement can also accomplish the non-financial goal of
promoting a new world order. The UN has police powers that "may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea,
or land forces of members of the United Nations."' 74 To be sure, the
164. Oil Minister, supra note 149, at 9.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. U.N. Wonders, supra note 155, at A17.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
171. Newsday, Oct. 3, 1991, at 14.
172. Chic. Trib., Oct. 31, 1991, at 3.
173. U.N. Wonders, supra note 155, at A17.
174. Frank & Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth", 85
AM. J. INT'L. L. 63 (1991)(citing art. 42 of the UN Charter).
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UN had used her police powers before the Persian Gulf Crisis. 75
The Korean War is an example of a prior exercise of the police pow-
ers.' 76 However, the UN response in the Gulf Crisis is particularly
noteworthy. Iraq was a country whose armed forces were exper-
ienced and massive, 177 but a twenty-six nation coalition 78 swiftly
subdued Hussein's war machine and restored Kuwait's sover-
eignty. 79 The old rivals of the United States and the former Soviet
Union were now united superpowers in their support of the police
action. 8 ' The exercise of UN police powers sent a message of deter-
rence to other powerful nations who may violate international law by
the use of force in the future.
IV. Winners' Reconstruction of Loser
A. Introduction
Both the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Persian Gulf Cease-
Fire Agreement attempted to provide a way for the winning parties
in those underlying conflicts to aid the economies of the losing par-
ties. First, the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Cease-Fire Agreement
each have shown respect for the sovereignty of the losing party. Sec-
ond, the Treaty and the Agreement allowed the defeated nations to
restore themselves, but made the process, in effect, contingent upon
benefiting the victorious parties. The United States aided the resto-
ration of Japan after World War II by strengthening her ties with
other nations' 8 ' and allowing her to freely develop her industries, in-
cluding the military. 8 2
The U.S. encouraged Japanese growth for a couple of reasons.
First, the United States did not want the continued and expensive
responsibility of supporting Japan. 8 Second, the U.S. wanted to
build a strong ally in Japan against the threats of Communist na-
tions, such as the then Soviet Union and China.184 The Allies
achieved an alliance with defeated Japan by providing economic op-
portunities under the Treaty. These opportunities made it in Japan's
best interest to choose a free enterprise system over Communism.
Similarly, in 1991-92, the Coalition forces want to aid in the
reconstruction of Iraq to promote a new world order, a lasting peace,
175. See id. at 70.
176. Id.
177. Hart, supra note 108, at 36.
178. Nelan, supra note 36, at 33.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
180. Grammas, supra note 7, at 5.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 204-12.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 212-15.
183. See F.S. DUNN, supra note 2, at 191-192.
184. Id.
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available oil supplies, and reparations. The Coalition forces' hope to
encourage compliance by an embargo and by promotion and ex-
ploitation of conditions that increase Iraq's need to comply with the
Agreement. Therefore, the Coalition has tried to strengthen ties
among Iraq and Coalition members,1 85 while prompting the ouster of
the belligerent and volatile Iraqi leader, President Hussein.186 The
Coalition has also benefitted from conditions that tend to promote
Iraq's early compliance, such as a possible inability to find oil buyers
and an enormous national debt. 187 The Coalition has fortified its own
bargaining position by aiding Iraqi rebellions'88 and avoiding blame
for the poor health and nutrition conditions among Iraqi civilians.,89
B. Respect for Sovereignty of Losing Nation
The Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 and the Cease-Fire Agree-
ment of 1991 both tried to recognize the national sovereignty of the
losing nations. The Japanese Peace Treaty stated that "the Allied
Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over
Japan and its territorial waters."' 90 However, the Treaty provided
that the United States would "have the right to exercise all and any
powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction" over Japan.'
The Treaty further stated that the Allied Powers would cease to oc-
cupy Japan as soon as possible and no later than ninety days after
the Treaty came into force. 192 Finally, the Treaty also recognized
that Japan had "the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense" pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.'93 The Treaty noted that: "Japan may voluntarily enter into
collective security arrangements."' 94
The Cease-Fire Agreement also recognizes the sovereignty of
Iraq despite Iraq's claims that here sovereignty has been violated by
United Nations weapons controls. 95 These controls provide that the
United Nations will monitor Iraqi armed forces as long as President
Hussein is in power. 96 Iraq will have to submit. reports twice per
year concerning any work that might have a military application.' 9 7
185. See infra text accompanying notes 235-37.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 238-39.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 240-50.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 241-43.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 244-49.
190. Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 1(b).
191. Id., art. 3.
192. Id., art. 6.
193. Id., art. 5.
194. Id.
195. Baghdad Complains To U.N. Over Tougher Restrictions On Weapons, L.A. Times,
Oct. 13, 1991, at A6, col. 2 [hereinafter Babhdad Complains].
196. Id.
197. Id.
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However, the Hussein Government has been allowed to continue to
rule Iraq. In addition, Iraq been not been denied the right to protect
herself or maintain her strong armed forces. Thus, the Japanese
Peace Treaty and the Cease-Fire Agreement were generous to the
losing parties by permitting them to maintain basic sovereignty.
C. Positive Reinforcement: Building a Strong Ally or Weak
Enemy
The Japanese Peace Treaty and the Persian Gulf War Cease-
Fire Agreement both related the reconstruction of the losing party
with the victorious parties's desire to receive reparations. The United
States, in particular, wanted to create a strong ally in Japan. 198 Sec-
retary of State Dulles wanted Japan's post-war economic revival
under Democracy to stand as a beacon throughout Asia to discour-
age the expansion of Communism. 199
Thus, the Treaty provides that the Allied Powers could not seize
many types of Japanese assets.2 00 Among these properties were in-
cluded the following: "real property, furniture and fixtures" owned
by the Japanese government and used for diplomatic or consular
purposes; private property not of an investment nature owned by
Japanese officials and normally necessary for carrying out diplomatic
and consular functions; properties of religious and charitable groups;
assets which have been acquired after Japan surrendered and not in
violation of the-laws of the Allied Powers; "obligations of Japan or
Japanese nationals"; tangible property in Japan; and enterprises or-
ganized under Japanese law and expressed in Japanese currency.,0
In addition, Japanese trademarks, which involved both literary and
artistic property, would be afforded favorable treatment by each Al-
lied nation as permitted by their own laws.20 1 Meanwhile, all other
Allied claims for war reparations and the cost of occupation were
waived.113
The Japanese Peace Treaty also tried to strengthen Japan's ties
with other nations to encourage relations that would benefit the Al-
lied Powers. For example, Japan - pursuant to the Treaty - de-
clared her intention to join the United Nations, in order to operate in
accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to
conform to internationally accepted fair practices in public and pri-
vate commerce. 4 Allied nations could renew their pre-war treaties
198. See F.S. DUNN, supra note 2, at 191-192 passim.
199. Id. at 99.
200. See Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 14.
201. Id., art. 14(a).
202. Id., art. 14(a)(V).
203. Id., art. 14(b).
204. Id., preamble.
Spring 19921
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF -INTERNATIONAL LAW
with Japan within one year after the Treaty became effective.2 "
Japan and the Allied Powers would also negotiate to create an
agreement regarding regulation of fishing on the high seas206 (an im-
portant concern of the Allied Powers) and other commercial rela-
tions. 2 7 Japan would negotiate agreements with Allied Powers con-
cerning civil air transport.208 She would also become a party to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation.209
Moreover, the Treaty provided that Japan would affirm her lia-
bility for debts incurred prior to the war and would enter negotia-
tions for the purpose of repaying her creditors. 10 The Treaty also
allowed the Japanese industries to develop new markets in non-Com-
munist nations of the South and Southeast Asia 1 ' to avoid Japanese
dependence on Communist nations and thus to discourage possible
Communist sympathies.
2 12
The Treaty, in an attempt to create a strong Japanese ally
against Communism, was not afraid to aid in rebuilding Japanese
industries that might be used to recreate a war machine.21 3 Notably,
the Japanese economy was given its greatest boost from the fact that
the Allied Powers placed no restrictions on the Japanese shipbuild-
ing.214 Furthermore, the Treaty itself did not strip Japan of military
power. In fact, the United States planned a regulated rearmament of
Japan.21 5 The United States aided in Japan's rebuilding of potential
war factories for a number of reasons. First, the Allies could not
gain an ally in Japan by suppressing her industries, assuming that
such industries could be suppressed. 1 6 Second, the United States be-
lieved that a rebuilt Japan posed no serious threat to the Allies be-
cause Japan understood that it was in her own best interest to be
allied against the Communist nations. 7 Third, Japan would be a
more valuable ally if she had a strong military force. 218
On the other hand, the Persian Gulf War Cease-Fire Agree-
ment is designed to allow for the reconstruction of Iraq if she pays
reparations to the UN, thus, the Agreement makes Iraq's compli-
ance with UN resolutions to be in Iraq's best interest if Iraq desires
205. Id., art. 7(a).
206. Id., art. 9.
207. Id., art. 12(a).
208. Id., art. 13(a)(c).
209. Id.
210. Id., art. 18(a).
211. F.S. DUNN, supra note 2, at 150.
212. Id. at 145.
213. Id. at 155.
214. Id. at 153.
215. Id. at 155.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 156.
218. Id. at 155-156.
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aid in restoring her country. The Coalition forces want to aid in the
restoration of Iraq to ensure a new world order, a lasting peace,
available oil, and reparations. President Bush has envisioned "a new
world order . . in which a credible United Nations can use its
peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise envisioned of the U.N.'s
founders. 219
However, the Agreement must maintain the peace won by the
Coalition forces.220 This may be a difficult task. If the Agreement
fails to aid in successfully rebuilding Iraq's economy, then the conse-
quences of that failure coupled with a failure to reassimilate Iraq
among peaceful nations may ignite another war. 22 1 The Agreement
attempts to reduce the reoccurrence of war in the Middle-East by
limiting Iraq's arms. However, the unhealed divisions in the Arab
world, coupled .with economic needs that may not be solved by oil
revenues, have set the stage for war to resurface.222
A dangerous alliance between Iraq and Iran may form because
both nations have grown alienated from other nations in the region
and have severely damaged economies.22 Iraq has a large war debt
from both her wars with Iran and Kuwait. 2 4 Iran's economy also
has been ravaged by war with Iraq.2 5 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has
initiated an arms build-up,22 and Israel antagonizes by flying
through Iraqi airspace. 27 Granted, the United States' military pres-
ence in the region presently deters conflict from arising.22 8 But how
long can the United States maintain a substantial military presence
in the Middle East before she is forced to withdraw as the result of
public sentiment? 2 9 The chance to maintain a new world order is
complicated, moreover, by the need for available oil. The Persian
Gulf War demonstrated that the world oil market is interdependent.
An embargo of Iraqi-and Kuwaiti oil, in conjunction with the Soviet
Union's decrease in production on account of political unrest, created
a sharp rise in oil prices.2 30 The elevated oil prices aggravated a
world mired in a recession.2 31 The Agreement thus aims not to un-
duly antagonize the Iraqis because of their influence and power in
219. Grammas, supra note 7, at 1.
220. See Askari, supra note 16, at 15.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Rowe, U.N. Flights to Continue Despite Iraqi Warning; Baghdad Complains
About Israeli Aircraft, Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 1991, at A47 [hereinafter U.N. Flights].
228. Askari, supra note 16, at 15.
229. Id.
230. Oil Prices Jump, supra note 150.
231. See, e.g. In The Picture, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 79.
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the oil industry." 2 However, eliciting substantial cash reparations
from the thoroughly defeated yet proud Iraqis may antagonize Iraq.
Iraq may then retaliate by constricting the world's available oil
supply. 23
3
The Agreement uses a number of ways to prompt Iraqi compli-
ance. Perhaps the most important way is by maintaining an embargo
against Iraq until she complies with the Cease-Fire's reparations re-
quirements. 34 The Cease-Fire Agreement has also encouraged com-
pliance through efforts to strengthen ties among Iraq and the nations
of the Coalition. For example, the Agreement provides that Iraq
shall recognize the boundaries between her and Kuwait as set out in
a treaty among them in 1964.33 Also, the UN invited Iraq to reaf-
firm her obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of
the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 236 Then, Iraq was invited to re-
affirm her obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968.237
The Agreement tries to establish a lasting peace by encouraging
the ouster of President Hussein. His leave of office was designed to
appear as if it was in the best interest of Iraqi security. The United
Nations will monitor Iraq's military developments as long as Hussein
is President of Iraq.238 President Hussein would not be a stabilizing
influence in a new world order. He demonstrated his volatility by
invading Kuwait after concluding an eight-year war with Iran. Con-
sequently, President Bush has called for President Hussein's re-
moval.239 In addition, the Coalition has maximized and utilized post-
war conditions to encourage Iraq to comply with the Agreement.
Compliance would end the embargo and allow Iraqi industries to re-
store themselves. One thing that may happen is the questionable
prospect of Iraq finding a buyer of her oil once the embargo is re-
moved, may encourage an early compliance. However, even if the
embargo were removed, Iraq may still have to wait a substantial pe-
riod of time before restoration could be effectuated.2 14 For example,
the UN has provided for procedures in which Iraq can sell regulated
amounts of oil to help finance the Post-Persian Gulf War reconstruc-
tion.241 A senior UN official conceded, however, that the UN regula-
232. See supra text accompanying notes 72 & 73.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 149-170.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
235. Resolution 687, supra note 56, 2.
236. Id., 7.
237. Id., 11.
238. Baghdad Complains, supra note 195, at A6.
239. Better Cooperation, supra note 153, at A14.
240. See U.N. Flights, supra note 227, at A47.
241. Oil Minister, supra note 149, at A9.
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tions may discourage prospective buyers from purchasing Iraqi oil
because oil - free of restrictions - is. available from other
nations. 42
Specifically, a buyer of Iraqi oil, in contrast with a buyer of oil
from another nation, must incur the additional cost of procuring ap-
proval from both the buyer's nation and from the UN Security
Council's Sanctions Committee. 43 In addition, many buyers will be
discouraged from contracting for Iraqi oil because a substantial risk
exists that the business relationship will be severed because of politi-
cal unrest. For example, Iraq may become involved in another war
with either another nation or with Iraqi Kurdish rebels.2 44 Thus, Iraq
may not be able to turn on the faucet of recovery immediately after
the UN embargo is lifted. Consequently, Iraq would be encouraged
to bring an earlier end to the embargo to initiate as soon as possible,
what may already be a delayed recovery.
Other factors also aggravate the prospects of a successful recov-
ery for Iraq. For instance, Iraq may not be able to earn the neces-
sary revenue from oil sales to handle her large debt 45 and reparation
demands.24 This is because there may be an excess of oil within two
or three years that will drive down the price of oil.2 47 One reason for
the potential excess is that Saudi Arabia has indicated during a re-
cent Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meet-
ing that Saudi Arabia would produce as much oil as possible, even if
other OPEC nations objected.24 8 When UN oil export sanctions are
lifted, moreover, Iraq plans to approximately double her pre-war oil
production by the year 1995.249 Iran also aims to increase her oil
production to heal her war-ridden economy.2 50 Kuwait oil production
should also bounce back within the next few years. 251 The net in-
creased and unrestricted production of oil threatens to make the
commodity more common and less valuable in rebuilding Iraq's
economy.
The Persian Gulf War Cease-Fire Agreement has not assisted
Iraq in repressing, rebellions within Iraq's own borders and has thus
increased Iraq's desire-to comply with UN resolutions. These rebel-
lions have been encouraged most likely by the weakened state of the
Iraqi government following the war, as aggravated by the embargo.
242. U.N. Flights, supra note 227, at A47.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 157-63.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 117-23.
247. Askari, supra note 16, at 15.
248. Id.
249. Oil Minister, supra note 149, at A9.
250. Askari, supra note 16, at 15.
251. Id.
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In addition, UN forces have encouraged these rebellions. 252 For ex-
ample, UN forces led by the United States, protected hundreds of
thousands of Kurdish refugees in their return to northern Iraq,
where the Kurdish guerrillas control cities in rebellion against the
government of President Hussein.2 53 Moreover, President Hussein
has not invaded Kurdish controlled territories because of the threat
of immediate retaliation by the UN air-force that patrols over
Iraq.2 54 Thus, while the Japanese Peace Treaty aimed to get Japan
back on her feet, the implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement
tries to keep Iraq off her feet, and thus, it encourages Iraqi compli-
ance with reparation demands.
Although the Agreement has kept Iraq off her feet, the UN
may have avoided moral culpability for the poor post-war conditions
among Iraqi civilians by offering aid in a way that maintains the
poor conditions, while shifting the blame to Iraq. Arguably, public
sentiment could force the UN embargo to end 'prior to Iraqi compli-
ance if the embargo were seen as the direct cause of extreme suffer-
ing among Iraqi civilians. The UN may be conditioning desperately
needed medical and food aid to Iraq upon another opportunity to
make the Hussein government appear inadequate to provide for the
Iraqi people. President Hussein is unlikely to accept the UN's
bargain.
As of 1992, Iraq is in dire need of food and medicine.25 5 The
allied bombings and embargo has created health and malnutrition
problems for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, according to Iraq.2 56
Since the Persian Gulf War started, Iraqis have real earnings of 7 %
of the prewar level, but the food price index has increased by
2000%.217 Nearly one million Iraqi children are malnourished.2 5 8
Before the war, the mortality rate for children under five years of
age was about twenty eight per 1,000; between January and August
1991 the mortality rate rose to approximately 104 deaths per
1,000.259
Although the United Nations is willing to extend relief, and the
Hussein government is willing to accept relief, the two sides have not
come to terms with an agreeable method to distribute the aid.260
Pursuant to Resolution 666, the United Nations only will approve
252. See Economic Pressure, supra at note 107.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Blocking Aid, supra note 58, at 4.
256. id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Shannon, U.S. Denies Blame For Malnutrition In Iraq, L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 1991,
at A4, col. 1.
260. See Blocking Aid, supra note 58, at 4.
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humanitarian food distribution to Iraq and Kuwait if the food is
given out directly to the Iraqi people by approved international
groups."0 1 However, Iraq only will accept aid if the Iraqi government
can distribute and ration the aid directly to the Iraqi people.262 The
Iraqi Minister of Health, Abdul Salam M. Saaid, has refused to al-
low third 1arties to give aid to the Iraqi people because the relief is
designed to quiet anti-embargo sentiments in the United States.263
He also indicated that the Iraqi government wanted to distribute the
aid themselves to avoid creating both riots and the appearance that
the Iraqi people are beggars.264
Iraq has legitimate political concerns of a sovereign nation.
However, the UN may be more concerned with the political effect
than the practical effect of aid distribution. The UN, by starving
Iraq with an embargo and rescuing her with charity, may be trying
to build a bond between the Iraqi people and anti-Hussein forces,
while simultaneously lowering the respect of the Iraqi people for the
Hussein government. By avoiding culpability for causing direct suf-
fering to Iraqi civilians, the UN can use the embargo to enforce
compliance with the Cease-Fire Agreement.
V. Conclusion
The Cease-Fire Agreement may be better designed than the
Japanese Peace Treaty for effectuating reparations for the victors.
This is despite the fact that the Agreement and the Treaty are simi-
lar in many ways. The source of the superior design of the Agree-
ment, however, lies in that the success of restorations under the
Treaty had to precede reparations, while under the Cease-Fire
Agreement reparations must precede restoration.
The Treaty enticed Japan to choose a free-market economy over
a Communist system by initiating restoration of the Japanese econ-
omy.285 The Allies availed Japan of new markets and freedom in
industrial development. 266 The Allies did not receive substantial fi-
nancial reparations from Japan, other than winning her alliance
against the Communists.267
In contrast, the Coalition is enticing Iraq to comply with the
Agreement by withholding reconstruction. 268 The United Nations
Embargo will not be lifted, and thus, Iraq's economic recovery will
261. Chic. Trib., Feb. 28, 1991, at 5.
262. See Blocking Aid, supra note 58, at 4.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. F.S DUNN, supra note 2, at 144 passim.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 198-215.
267. See F.S. DUNN, supra note 2, at 152.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
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be severely limited until Iraq complies with the Agreement. The Co-
alition hopes to achieve its goals of a new world order and a lasting
peace, available oil, and financial reparations.
The Agreement does not hand over restoration to the losing
party as freely as the Japanese Treaty did. The victors can more
carefully control the payment of reparations by the losing party be-
cause the losing party must conform to the victor's choice of a quid
pro quo. To be sure, stronger control of reparations payment does
not necessarily translate into better effectuation of reparations. For
instance, perhaps Secretary of State Dulles was correct in claiming
that the cost of seeking financial reparations exceeded what could be
collected from a losing nation. 69 The Japanese Peace Treaty pursu-
ant to Dulles' reasoning aimed at less control of the conquered state
to better develop a political alliance.
The Agreement, however, can also accomplish the political goal
of creating a new world order in which nations will be deterred from
violating international law for fear of retaliation from a powerful co-
alition of armed forces."' The regulation of Iraq's or a similar na-
tion's behavior will encourage them to rationalize their actual behav-
ior to bring them into spiritual as well as physical alliance with
international law.
Adam Andrew Levy
269. F.S DUNN, supra note 2, at 151-152.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 179-180.
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